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Measuring the Impact of Philosophy 
 
1. The question of concern for this inquiry is “what evidence is there on the 
feasibility or effectiveness of estimating the economic impact of research” in 
this field?  There is a current tendency to think that evidence consists only in  
empirical studies. But what matters is warrant, and for warrant what matters 
are the reasons and valid arguments that support the conclusion being 
warranted. Empirical studies are only a small part of the body of reasons 
necessary to license a conclusion. There are a number of theoretical and 
methodological reasons to believe that estimating the impact of philosophical 
research is not a feasible project.   
 
2. The impact that a body of research has made on an outcome is the 
difference in that outcome supposing that the research occurred versus what 
would have happened had the research not occurred. This makes finding 
evidence for the impact of philosophical research especially difficult since 
philosophical impacts are likely to be felt primarily over the middle to long 
term; they are likely to be indirect rather than direct; and they are likely to 
have more cultural effects than economic ones, at least in the near to middle 
future, and cultural effects are in general both harder to articulate and harder 
to measure than economic ones. 
 
3. Perhaps a vivid example can help. What effects could be expected on 
culture, thought, politics and the economy in 25 years time from cutting funds 
for philosophy research by 25% during the next 5 years? Or, instead consider 
the easier after-the-fact question: Had overall available funds for philosophy 
been 25% less 25 years ago and onwards, what economic and cultural 
differences would there be now?  What differences would such cuts have 
made on the effects of research contributions from Britain’s great and well-
known post-war philosophers, such as Isaiah Berlin, Bernard Williams, Karl 
Popper, Amartya Sen, Mary Warnock, AJ Ayer or Michael Dummett? And 
what would have been the difference in the effects from the research of the 
large number of fine but lesser known philosophers doing the ‘normal science’ 
of the field.  
 
4. We will first present a number of respects in which the contributions of 
philosophy to social, economic and cultural life will remain under the radar of 
any measure of impact. Subsequently we will turn to some more formal 
reasons why this is to be expected in the current state of scientific knowledge 
concerning what kinds of impacts might occur and how these are to be 
predicted. 
  
5. Effects likely to be missed in measuring the impact of philosophical 
research and practice 
 
(i) Political debate.  There is no doubt that philosophers like Rawls, 
Nozick and Sen have had a huge impact on the political landscape 
and their names often occur in newspaper columns.  Does this 
mean that only Harvard should score on impact?  The fact that 
these thinkers have had an impact on the political landscape is due 
to the culture of discussion and reflection that philosophy 
departments offer to their students through their research and 
teaching.  These students then go on in journalism, politics, policy-
making etc.  The agents of this type of impact, i.e. philosophy 
faculties around the world, will sadly remain under the radar.  
(ii) Argumentative skills.  Philosophy department train students in 
logical reasoning, critical thinking and scientific method.  Our 
students then export these skills in the pursuit of law, scientific 
research, medical diagnosis etc.  But the philosophers that provided 
these tools will remain under the radar.  The situation can be 
compared to the relationship between calculus and engineering.  
The mathematics department may have a low score on impact, 
because their impact in the provision of tools to the engineer would 
be lost in the measurement of impact.     
(iii) Professional ethics.  Professionals face moral dilemmas throughout 
their careers and are called upon to make principled morally 
defensible decisions within their respective roles – be it business, 
medicine, human relations, etc.  In introducing cohorts of aspiring 
professionals to the history of moral theory, we provide our students 
with the tools for moral reasoning that will be invaluable in their 
future careers.  Such impact is of great importance to society, but is 
bound to get lost in measurement.  
(iv) Culture.  It is not uncommon for successful writers, film directors, 
entertainers, … to have an undergraduate degree in philosophy.  A 
society’s cultural achievements is often assessed in terms of its 
philosophical depth.  But once again, the chain of impact from the 
philosophical work to the actual cultural output is simply too long to 
be measured by impact factors.  
(v) The Good Life.  Last but not least, we live in a culture in which so 
many people face episodes of mental health—often in need of 
direction in their lives.  Religion has lost its relevance for many 
people in today’s increasingly secularised world.  Communal 
support is often lacking due to the anonymity of the metropolis.  
Counselling services are of great importance, but they are a cure 
rather than a prophylactic.  C.S. Lewis famously wrote ‘We read in 
order to know that we are not alone.’  Philosophy has by no means 
a monopoly on the task of providing insight in the eternal questions 
that touch on the meaning of life.  But it cannot be denied that it is a 
substantial contributor.  When we do lectures and run discussions 
on the eternal questions and some of our alumni tell us many years 
later that these courses ‘made a huge difference in their lives’, then 
have we, as professional philosophers, had ‘impact’?  We think so.  
But no impact factor has any chance of measuring this.    
 
6. There is a tendency to think that only empirical studies, journalistic 
contributions or actual physical or cultural artefacts count as impact.  But 
there is a long chain that comes into the creation of these achievements.  
Now it is easier to measure at the end of the chain, since in tracing the chain 
backward, it does become more and more difficult to assess the weight of all 
the agents of impact.  And this is precisely the danger.  The agents of impact 
at the beginning of the chain are forgotten, but they are no less real and 
provide no less of a contribution then the person who signs off on empirical 
study, the newspaper column, or the creator of the artefacts.  In ignoring the 
agents at the beginning of the chain, we would be only rewarding the workers 
of the last hour.    
 
7. General methodological difficulties for the feasibility of impact studies for 
philosophical research in the current state of knowledge  
 
(i)  A first issue to consider with respect to economic and cultural 
impact is what kinds of effects there might be. This already 
presents a major obstacle to the feasibility of impact 
measurement for philosophy since there has, as yet, been no 
serious work devoted to addressing this issue. We do not  have 
anything like a reasonable starting list of the kinds of effects that 
the presence or absence of philosophical research could make. 
Without a reasonable list of the kinds of effects to be studied 
one can of course not even get started on devising practicable 
measures and indicators of the size of these effects. 
 
 
(ii) The necessary tools are not available to calculate even roughly 
what the difference in these effects would be with and without 
various levels of philosophical research as input. Nor is it likely 
that reasonable tools can be constructed before the REF 
exercise.  There are a number of obvious reasons for this: a) the 
time period over which changes in the amount and quality of 
philosophy research would produce its most dramatic effects on 
culture, thought, politics and the economy is probably fairly long 
term; b) prediction gets harder as time goes on since models of 
evolution for almost any phenomenon tend to work best short 
term and because it becomes harder and harder to predict other 
factors that matter to the impact of the starting differences in 
research input; c) the possible effects of philosophy research 
are probably highly interactive so what difference in output might 
result from differences in input will depend heavily on other 
factors that are themselves very uncertain and extremely 
sensitive to large and small scale future developments. 
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